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In this paper, we examine if climate risk affects corporate cash holdings. Specifically, we 
investigate whether firms view climate change as a risk factor and reflect it into their cash holdings 
decision. Corporate cash holdings policy has received increasing academic attention (see e.g., 
Harford, 1999; Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Foley et al., 2007; 
Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Duchin, 2010; Gao et al., 2013; Nikilov and Whited; 2014; 
etc.). The studies on corporate cash holdings grow under two broad frameworks namely the 
precautionary motives due to firms’ financing frictions and the agency conflicts. Our empirical 
findings are consistent with the precautionary motives framework of corporate cash holdings and 
demonstrate that firms view climate change as a relevant risk factor and increase cash holdings as 
a result. 
There is ample anecdotal evidence that climate risk has a serious negative impact on the 
economy and its future growth. For instance, according to the US national climate assessment 
report in 2018, the US GDP is likely to drop by 10% by the end of this century due to losses 
concerning climate change.2  The Economic Intelligence Unit estimated in 2015 that a total of $4.2 
trillion of manageable assets remain under climate risk.3 Recent but fast-growing studies of climate 
change finance document several corporate policy implications due to climate risk and establish it 
 
2 Available at https://nca2018.globalchange.gov. This study predicts that farming in the Midwest would decline by 
75% and the southern part could also lose 25% soybean production. Heat stress has been responsible for an average 
$1.2 billion less dairy production since 2010 and likely to be more extensive in the coming years. Wildfire seasons 
become the longest and most destructive in the history and the severity is predicted to be six times higher by 2050. 
Sea levels go up by more than 7 inches over the last century, in lower latitude countries the scenario is even worse. 
3 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015). The Cost of Inaction: Recognizing the Value at Risk from Climate Change. 
[online] London, New York, Hong Kong, Geneva: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. Available 
at: https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.pdf 
 






as a long-term risk factor (see e.g., Bansal et al., 2016; Bernstein et al., 2019; Addoum et al., 2020; 
Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2020; Hsu et al., 2020, Painter, 2020; etc.). 
Moreover, climate change has become a top shareholder proposal issue in recent years.4 
Warren Buffet (CEO of Berkshire Hathaway), in his 2015 annual letter to shareholders, proposes 
that Berkshire would include a section in their annual report on how they are responding to climate 
change threats in ensuring operations.5 Investors increasingly find climate change as a relevant 
risk factor as companies worldwide have started voluntarily releasing reports on their plans to 
address climate change along with other corporate social and environmental responsibility issues. 
A survey by KPMG in 2017 finds that more than 60% of companies across all industries worldwide 
voluntarily release such corporate responsibility reports.6 There has been a substantial increase of 
this practice by Fortune Global 250 companies in recent years (44% in 2011, 55% in 2013, 65% 
in 2015, and 78% in 2017). Most recently (in January 2020), Larry Fink (CEO of BlackRock, one 
of the world’s largest asset managers), in his annual letter to the CEOs writes that BlackRock aims 
at making climate change issues central to its investment decisions. BlackRock CEO also mentions 
that firms seeking investment from BlackRock will require to release additional disclosure related 
to their climate risk exposure and how they plan to mitigate it.7 
LexisNexis (a pioneer aide platform in advanced risk management, business, and law research) 
recently highlights the adverse impacts of climate change on businesses. It particularly focuses on 
different aspects of business risks that can be exacerbated by climate change such as physical risks, 
shareholder activism considerations, compliance risks, federal regulations, international 
 
4 See https://www.issgovernance.com/library/climate-change-in-the-2018-us-agm-season/  
5 Link to Annual Letter to shareholders:  https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2015ltr.pdf 
6 See https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-
reporting-2017.pdf 
7 Link to Annual Letter to CEOs: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 
 






regulations, litigations risks, etc.  It has been also evident that a changing climate pattern has long-
term direct effects on the company’s property and supply chain. 
Given that it is not easy to hedge climate risk, how do firms respond to risk exposure imposed 
by climate change? Corporate cash holdings provide us with a useful setup to study this question. 
When firms anticipate a financial friction, they are likely to increase financial slacks that includes 
increase in corporate cash holdings (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Several studies document that 
corporate cash holdings help mitigate risks associated with such events that may lead to future 
liquidity shortage (Froot et al., 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 2000; Dessaint and Matray, 2017). 
Specifically, corporate cash holdings can work as a buffer in avoiding firms’ incapacity to finance 
positive NPV projects if faced with liquidity shocks due to climate risk exposure. 
Our study covers data from 41 different countries including the US. As the main measure of 
climate risk exposure, we use a proxy of long-term climate risk exposure developed by Hong et 
al. (2019) based on drought severity. Drought is considered as one of the best climate change 
indicators in climate science.8 In developing the long-term climate risk index, a trend-stationary 
AR (1) model with a time trend is estimated. From the econometric perspective, the coefficient on 
the time trend could be a reliable measure of long-term exposure to climate risk. We find that for 
a one standard deviation increase in our long-term climate risk measure firms’ cash holdings 
increase by 0.40%. This change is both statistically and economically significant. This increase in 
cash holdings is equivalent to a 2.5% rise compared to the average cash holding in our sample. We 
find similar result when we redo our analysis by moving cash holding variable one year forward 
 
8  See https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-are-some-signs-climate-change-1?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-
news_science_products 






(i.e., estimation of the lagged effects). We also use change in cash holdings as our dependent 
variable. In both cases, results confirm our earlier finding. 
About 32% of observations in our sample comes from the US. Therefore, it is a valid concern 
that the result is mainly driven by US firms. To alleviate this concern, we conduct a separate 
analysis by excluding the US firms and find even stronger results. Besides, determining firms’ 
climate risk exposure based on their headquarter locations can be misleading as their operations 
can be conducted at different locations than the headquarters (Garcia and Norli, 2012; Smith, 
2016). Restricting the sample to only US firms, we construct a weighted measure that follows 
Hong et al. (2019) but additionally considers firms’ geographic concentrations in different US 
states rather than only the headquarters. Redoing our previous analysis with this newly constructed 
firm-level climate risk measure, we find consistent results for the US firms. 
In this study, we employ three different identification strategies to validate the effect of climate 
risk on corporate cash holdings. First, following Painter (2020), we conduct a quasi-natural 
experiment around the release of Stern Review. The review is a 700-page long report (released for 
the UK government) that becomes widely known for its detailed discussion on the potential 
impacts of climate change on economy and businesses. Our analysis based on a difference-in-
difference set-up around the Stern Review confirms our earlier findings. Second, we exploit the 
economic link between firms and their customers. Firms’ customers have a major impact on firms’ 
economic growth and prosperity. Therefore, if a firm’s customers are exposed to higher climate 
risk, it could adversely affect that firm’s operations, revenue, and productivity.  We use Compustat 
Capital IQ customer segment data to identify firms’ customer locations and then we repeat our 
analysis with long-term climate risk exposure at customer locations instead of firms headquarter. 
We find that firms’ cash holdings increase when their customers are exposed to higher climate 






risk. This finding not only increases the credibility of our earlier findings but also alleviates the 
concern about using firms’ headquarters to measure climate risk exposure. Our third identification 
strategy is a placebo test. Given that corporate cash holdings and climate risk have been trending 
upwards, there is a concern that our finding is spurious. However, we find an insignificant 
coefficient on our placebo measure that further affirms our main finding and addresses the 
possibility of having documented a spurious positive relationship between firms’ cash holdings 
and long-term climate risk exposure. 
Moreover, our subsample analyses show that firms increase their cash holdings level in 
response to higher climate risk exposure when they financially constrained. Several prior studies 
suggest cross-sectional heterogeneities for corporate cash holdings based on various sources of 
firms’ financial constraints (see e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Kim et al., 
1998; Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 2004; Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Bates et al., 2009; 
Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Acharya et al., 2012; etc.). The results from our subsample analyses are 
consistent with our expectation and document stronger effects of climate risk in increasing 
corporate cash holdings for financially constrained firms. 
Our study belongs to the emerging climate finance literature that investigates climate risk 
implications on different corporate financial policies. Our results suggest that firms are aware of 
their adverse exposure to climate change and consequently they prepare themselves for the 
possible financial constraints by increasing cash holdings. A prior study by Dessaint and Matray 
(2017) also document an increase in firms’ cash holdings due to perceived liquidity risk. Our study 
is different from Dessaint and Matray (2017) for several reasons. First, while they consider a 
previously unknown and sudden natural calamity (hurricane) risk, i.e., catastrophic risk, we focus 
on the long-term climate change pattern. Second, their study builds upon the arguments related to 






the managerial overreaction while ours is consistent with firms’ rational precautionary motives. 
Lastly, our evidence is global while their study focuses on the US only. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
There are numerous established factors affecting corporate cash holdings. To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first empirical corporate finance study in global settings to document 
evidence that long-term exposure to adverse climate change leads firms to hold more cash. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review relevant literature 
and formulate hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. In section 4, we discuss 
our main results including baseline and robustness checks. We discuss our several identification 
strategies in section 5. We present our subsample analyses in section 6 and then write our 
concluding remarks in section 7. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Literature offers two broad frameworks to explain the dynamics of corporate cash holdings. 
They include firms’ precautionary motives, and agency problems. Beginning with Keynes (1936), 
several studies support and help explain firms’ precautionary motives (e.g., Harford, 1999; Opler 
et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009; Duchin, 2010; McLean, 2011; etc.) under different settings. Firms’ 
precautionary motives for holding cash arise when they expect a financing friction due to a 
mismatch between internal and external cost of capital (Opler et al., 1999). In fact, when external 
financing becomes scarce or costly, a negative cash flow shock (Bates et a., 2009) may prevent 
firms from undertaking projects with positive Net Present Value (NPV). Holding more cash by the 
firms could work as a buffer in such situations. The study by Bates et al. (2009) helps partially 
explain why the US public firms have been increasing cash holdings over the past couple of 
decades. The findings from Bates et al. (2009) indicate that it is the precautionary motive rather 






than the agency problem which drives a firm into holding more cash. Duchin (2010) argues that 
the “increasing cash flow uncertainty” motivates the firms to increase their level of cash. McLean 
(2011) argues that public firms issue shares as a source of increasing cash when they have the 
precautionary motives that are reflected in their high cash flow volatility and large Research and 
Development (RD) expenditures. A few other studies, such as Brav (2009) and Saunders and 
Steffen (2011), find that the implication of financing friction and therefore the necessity of cash 
holdings is even more important for private firms. 
Another important reason for cash holdings is the managerial agency problem (Jensen, 1986). 
Stulz (1990) argues that the agency problem is directly linked with firms’ ability to generate 
enough internal slack. An optimum level of internal slack helps firms avoid underinvestment but 
not leading towards overinvestment. However, several studies find that corporate insiders have 
more incentives to hold cash rather than paying dividends to the shareholders since they can use it 
as a flexible financing option in empire building or self-dealing (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Harford et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2013). These studies are consistent with a few other country-level 
studies which find that firms tend to hold more cash in countries with poor shareholder protection 
right (Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). Harford et al. (2008) argue that firms with 
entrenched managers have less intension to hold more cash rather they prefer overinvestment, 
leading to lower cash holdings in these public firms. In contrast, Nikolov and Whited (2014) 
document that typical agency problem leads to an increase of firms’ cash holding by about 22% 
which may also result in degradation of shareholder value by about 6%. 






Focusing on an environmental risk, Dessaint and Matray (2017) argue that managers perceive 
“hurricane risk”9  as a salient liquidity risk factor and as precautionary steps they increase firms’ 
cash holding at suboptimal level and express their concerns in financial reports even when firms 
are located at the neighborhood of the disaster area. Dessaint and Matray (2017) attribute their 
findings to managerial heuristic behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Apart from such 
managerial behavior, indeed firms’ physical risk due to climate change (i.e., climate risk at firm 
location) is a significant concern for the firms. Besides ample anecdotal evidence presented in the 
introduction section, a substantial amount of growing literature has established climate-related 
concerns as relevant risk factors that have serious corporate policy implications. For instance, 
Chava (2014) argues that investors demand a higher cost of capital for firms excluded by 
environmental screens (e.g., firms with climate change concerns, substantial emissions, etc. in their 
profile), and that lower number of institutional investors and fewer banks participate in their loan 
syndication. Truong, Nguyen, and Huynh (2017) find that climate change risk in the form of 
drought is not easily diversifiable and the market prices this risk into firm-level equity risk 
premium. 
Similarly, Bernstein et al. (2019) find that sea level rise reduces the value of exposed homes 
by about 7% compared to unexposed properties. Hong et al. (2019) examine international food 
stock performance and find that market still underreacts to drought (climate) risk. In contrast, 
Bansal et al. (2016) document that capital markets price long-run temperature shift. Bolton and 
Kacperczyk (2020) and Hsu et al. (2020) study cross-section of stock returns considering carbon 
 
9 Hurricane risk is most likely to be exacerbated by climate change related risk factors. For example, see 
https://www.c2es.org/content/hurricanes-and-climate-change/, 
https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07/how-climate-change-is-making-hurricanes-more-dangerous/, 
https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/ , etc.  






risk and environmental pollution respectively as climate risk factors and show that climate risks 
are well priced in the stock market. Painter (2020) finds that the credit spread for the long-term 
municipal bonds is significantly higher for the municipalities located nearby coastal areas and 
subject to the threat of sea level rise. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that climate risk exposure increases firms’ external cost 
of capital. Therefore, according to precautionary motives framework, firms should increase their 
cash holdings to better deal with the potential financial constraints caused by climate risk, leading 
to our main hypothesis: 
H1. Corporate cash holdings increase in exposure to climate risk. 
However, an increase in cash holdings can be costly for firms as it may require them to 
reduce spending on their current valuable investments if they are financially constrained. In this 
situation firms’ financial performance is fundamentally linked to their financial health (Almeida 
et al., 2004). Under this situation, the financially constrained firms need to make a choice between 
the profitability of current and future investments and determine their optimal cash holding policies 
accordingly (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 
2012). For the financially unconstrained firms, such a situation is not as relevant since they can 
finance all their current and future NPV projects smoothly. This important difference in cash 
holdings policy between financially constrained and unconstrained firms has cross-sectional 
implications. Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that financially constrained firms show higher 
propensity for cash holdings out of their cash inflow, indicating a higher “cash flow sensitivity of 
cash”. As discussed earlier, firms’ cost of capital increase with climate risk (e.g., Chava, 2014; 
Bansal et al., 2016; Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2020; Painter, 2020; etc.). Consequently, Firms that 
are more financially constrained have a greater incentive to hold more cash. Therefore, the increase 






in cash holding as a result of climate risk should be stronger for these firms. It leads to our 
supporting hypothesis:  
H1-a. The increase in the cash holdings resulting from exposure to climate risk is 
stronger for financially constrained firms. 
3. Data and methodology  
3.1 PDSI global data  
Following Hong et al. (2019), we use global Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) data 
as our measure of climate risk.10 Hong et al. (2019) collect and combine U.S. data from National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Center for Environmental 
Information (NCEI) and other countries’ data from University Corporation for Atmospheric 
Research (UCAR). PDSI is the measure of drought intensity that climate studies widely use (see 
e.g., Alley, 1984; Guttman et al., 1992; Dai et al., 2004; Li et al., 2007; Dai, 2011; Beyaztas et al., 
2018). Palmer (1965) develops it through a supply-demand model utilizing soil’s moisture, 
temperature, evaporation and recharge rates. The PDSI value ranges from -10 to +10; the negative 
values indicate more drought conditions and the positive values indicate moisture conditions.11 
Monthly frequency PDSI data is available from January 1900 to December 2014.  
 
10 Available for download at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sm_179oVQP1hGHSzOorLpeuqpp1AZO_R/view . 
We thank Dr. Frank Weikai Li for generously sharing the dataset. 
11 If the PDSI value is less than -4, the condition is graded as extreme drought. Likewise, -3.9 to -3: severe drought; -
2.9 to -2: moderate drought; -1.9 to 1.9: normal condition; 2 to 2.9: moderate moisture, 3 to 3.9: highly moisture; 4 
and above: extreme moisture.  
 






3.2 Estimation of TREND  
We follow Hong et al. (2019) to estimate the coefficients of time trend using the following 
augmented AR (1) model: 
𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒙,𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃 ∗ 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒙 + 𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒙,𝒕 𝟏 + 𝜺𝒙,𝒕                     (𝟏) 
In equation (1), the coefficient b captures the long-term climate change (drought) exposure of each 
country x, at the time point t. We take arithmetic average of monthly b values to have yearly trend 
data. For the ease of exposition and a more accessible discussion of our results, we flip the sign of 
b and multiply it by 1000 to construct our key independent variable, TREND. In this way, a higher 
value of TREND indicates higher long-term climate change risk exposure (more drought-like 
condition). 
3.3 Firm specific variables and summary statistics 
We obtain firm specific balance sheet data from Compustat (combination of North America 
and Global) fundamental annual database. We remove utility and financial firms (two-digit SIC 
codes: 49, 60-69) as they are highly regulated. We drop firms with market capitalization of less 
than $10 million (we convert global firms’ market capitalization to US dollars using exchange rate 
data from Compustat). We delete observations with missing industry (SIC) information and with 
missing or negative cash dividend. We drop the observations with greater than 100% change in 
assets and sales in two consecutive years to eliminate the impact of large corporate events, for 
instance, mergers and acquisitions. All our continuous variables (except TREND) are Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) adjusted and winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level.  Since the global 
drought-index (PDSI) used for the construction of TREND is not available beyond the year 2014, 
and prior to 1985 the climate change was less of an issue, we follow Hong et al. (2019) and restrict 






our sample period to 1985-2014. Finally, we are left with an unbalanced panel of 384,966 firm-
year global observations from 41 different countries including the United States. Overall, there is 
a total of 37,361 unique firms in the dataset among which 11,632 are U.S. firms. In the appendix 
table A1, we provide the description of all variables and their sources. Panel A of table 1 presents 
the summary statistics. 
[Insert Table 1, about here] 
In our final sample, the mean of cash (over total asset) is 0.162 which indicates that on average 
firms hold 16.2% of their total assets as cash. The standard deviation of cash (over total asset) is 
0.183 ensuring that there is substantial variation in our dependent variable. Our key independent 
variable, TREND, also shows a large variation across the sample with a mean of 0.026 and 
standard deviation of 0.128. The descriptive statistics of other control variables are also consistent 
with prior empirical studies. We present country-wise breakdown of our dependent variable 
(CASH) and key independent variable (TREND) in panel B of table 1. In our sample, firms from 
Taiwan, Israel, Australia, China, US, and Japan are found to hold more cash on average, while 
firms located in Taiwan, Peru, Israel, Japan, and Austria are found to have relatively higher long-
term climate risk exposure. Comparing the standard deviations of both CASH and TREND 
variables, we find that firms located in Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, China, Philippines, Egypt, 
and Brazil show higher inclination towards corporate cash holdings in response to the higher 
variation of climate risk exposure. 
3.4 Methodology  
Following Opler et al. (1999), Harford et al. (2008), and Bates et al. (2009), we estimate a 
panel regression model: 






𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊,𝒙,𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑵𝑫𝒙,𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒒 ∗ 𝑿𝒒,𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑴𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒙,𝒕 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒕 +
𝒒
𝟐
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒊 + 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒙 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒙,𝒕            (𝟐) 
In equation (2), 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ , ,  is our key dependent variable which we define as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to total assets of firm 𝑖 located in country 𝑥 in the year 𝑡. 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷 ,  is our 
key independent variable that we construct as a measure of climate change exposure in the year 𝑡 
to the firms located in the country 𝑥  (details provided in section 2.2). 𝑋 , ,  is the vector of firm-
level control variables. Following Bates et al. (2009), we control for firm size, market to book 
ratio, leverage, research and development expenditure, cash flow, non-cash working capital, 
acquisitions, dividend, and industry sigma. Given the global setting of our study, it is necessary to 
include country-specific macroeconomic factors in our model. Following Kacheva and Lins 
(2007), we add GDP per capita, private credit to GDP ratio, Consumer Price Index (CPI), and 
stock market capitalization as country-specific macroeconomic factors. All variables are defined 
in appendix table A1. We apply year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and country fixed effects 
in our regression model. We also cluster standard errors at firm-level. The coefficient of interest 
is 𝛽   and a positive and statistically significant coefficient would be consistent with our hypothesis 
𝐻 . 
4. Univariate analysis, baseline results and robustness checks 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
In this section, we conduct simple mean difference tests by sorting our data into different 
quartiles of TREND (Q1: least exposure to Q4: highest exposure). Specifically, we sort our sample 
based on TREND and create portfolios and then compare the average cash holdings in each 
portfolio. This portfolio analysis is a widely used technique in asset pricing literature, but it can be 






used (and is used) in other contexts. As pointed out by Bali, Engle, and Murray (2016), the main 
benefit of portfolio analysis is that it is a nonparametric technique that unlike other methodologies 
does not rely on any assumptions about the functional form of the variables under investigation 
and is, therefore, useful for understanding the cross-sectional relations. While the main setback of 
this technique is the difficulty to control for a large number of variables, Bali et al. (2016) argue 
that if the pattern emerging from a portfolio analysis is monotonic or near monotonic, which 
happens to be the case here, it is a strong indication that the result of the difference portfolio (Q4-
Q1) is not spurious. 
[Insert Table 2, about here] 
We do this in two different ways. First, we determine TREND quartiles using our whole 
dataset regardless of its associated country. In this way we find that mean cash holding in our 
sample is 14.91% for Q1 group and 16.62% for Q4 group. The difference is 1.71% (t-stat. = 22.17) 
and statistically significant at 1% level. Next, we determine TREND quartiles based on the 
associated countries (i.e., groups are made for each country separately). In this way we find that 
the overall difference between mean cash holding of two extreme groups (Q4-Q1) is 2.39% and 
highly significant (t-stat= 28.93). In similar fashion, we also examine the difference between above 
median (Q34) and below median (Q12) TREND groups in both ways and find consistent results. 
From generic statistical and econometric points of view, our univariate analysis, presented in panel 
A of table 2, is arguably reliable as we use a large sample. 
We provide more insight at the country level in panel B of table 2. In most of the cases the 
difference is in line with our hypothesis and statistically significant. For instance, countries with 
greater observations in the sample, US, Canada, China, and Australia show a positive and 






significant mean difference between the extreme groups. A notable exception is UK, but the 
magnitude of the difference is relatively small. 
4.2 Baseline results 
In the first two models of table 3 , cash (over total asset) is our dependent variable. The 
second model includes additional country-level macroeconomic factors as controls. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, in both cases the 𝛽  coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
Focusing on model (2), the coefficient of TREND is positive and statistically significant (β = 
0.031; t-statistics = 2.37). It means that for a one standard deviation change in TREND (0.128), 
there is about 0.40% increase in firms’ cash holding. Compared to the mean cash holding in our 
sample (16.2%), this is equivalent to about 2.5% increase in cash holding. 
[Insert Table 3, about here] 
While we formally address endogeneity concerns later in the paper, to mitigate 
endogeneity-related biases related to simultaneity and omitted variables, we move cash, our 
dependent variable, forward by one year, essentially estimating the effect of TRENDt-1. We report 
the results in models (3) and (4). The results we obtain under this setting confirm our previous 
findings from model (1) and (2). In the last two specifications, we use the change in cash holdings 
as our dependent variable. Results confirm our earlier finding. The coefficient on TREND is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms increase their cash holding when 
exposed to higher climate risk. 






4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Baseline results excluding the US observations 
About 32% of our sample comes from the US. To ensure that our baseline results are not 
driven by a single country, we redo our baseline analysis eliminating the US observations from 
our sample. In this way, we get a 𝛽  coefficient of 0.059 (t-statistics: 4.09) for model (2) that is 
even of higher magnitude than before and statistically significant at 1% level. 
[Insert Table 4, about here] 
This finding suggests that for the non-US sample a one standard deviation increase in TREND 
leads to a 5.6% rise in cash holdings compared to average cash holdings.12  The results from all 
other models (i.e., models (1), and (3) to (6)) in table 4 are also consistent with our main hypothesis 
and confirm our earlier baseline results. 
4.3.2 Alternative firm-level proxies 
4.3.2.1 State-weighted TREND using firms’ geographic concentration 
The historical PDSI data are separately available at NOAA’s website for 48 US mainland 
states since1895. Utilizing this dataset, we further explore the state-level impact of long-term 
adverse climate change pattern on corporate cash holdings for U.S. firms. While doing so, we also 
consider a potential downside of using firms’ headquarter to measure climate risk exposure. 
Locations other than headquarters can also be important for firms’ operations (Garcia and Norli, 
2012; Smith, 2016).  Garcia and Norli (2012) construct a measure of US firms’ geographic 
concentrations in different states.13 Specifically, their measure is based on the proportion of how 
 
12 The standard deviation of TREND for our international sample (i.e., excluding US) is 0.147 and the average cash 
holdings of our international sample is 15.48%. 
13  We are sincerely thankful to Garcia and Norli (2012) for generously sharing their dataset. 






many times different states are mentioned in firms’ 10-K reports. It resembles a probability 
distribution of firms’ activities in different states. This measure in combination with Hong et al. 
(2019) enables us to construct a more realistic firm-level proxy of state-weighted climate risk for 
US firms.  We report our analysis based on this firm-level state-weighted climate risk measure 
(WT_STTREND) in model (1) of table 5. 
[Insert Table 5, about here] 
Here, we find that the TREND coefficient is 0.121 with t-statistics value of 2.75 (statistically 
significant at 1% level). This value means that for a one standard deviation increase in state-
weighted trend (0.041), US firms increase their cash holdings by about 0.50%. Which is also 
economically significant as it suggests a 2.6% increase compared to the mean cash holding for the 
US firms used in this analysis (19%). 
4.3.2.2 Firm-level environmental risk 
We conduct another robustness test for our findings based on a different firm-level 
environmental risk proxy (LOG_ENRISK) constructed by Hassan et al. (2019).14 The construction 
of the measure involves computational linguistics (i.e., textual analysis) and is based on firms’ 
quarterly earnings conference calls. The proxy we use here is basically a sub-component of firm-
level overall political risk that is separately quantified by Hassan et al. (2019). As the authors 
explicitly mention, this proxy measures the firm-level political risk due to climate legislation 
(Hassan et al., 2019, p. 2189). We report the results from this analysis in model (2) of table 5. We 
also find positively significant 𝛽  coefficient from this analysis that is consistent with our main 
hypothesis and it confirms our previous findings. 
 
14 Firm-level environmental risk data available at https://www.firmlevelrisk.com/ 






5. Identification strategies 
5.1 The impact of Stern Review 
In this section, following Painter (2020), we conduct a quasi-natural experiment, 
surrounding the release of Stern Review in 2006. The report is the first to widely reveal the impact 
of climate change on different economic resources and it estimates the costs associated with 
climate change. This 700-page long report suggests that the early actions on climate change can 
be economically beneficial in a sense that they will significantly outweigh the future losses (Stern, 
2008). This view is consistent with the underlying mechanism of firms’ precautionary motives 
framework for corporate cash holdings as we discuss earlier. The intuition is that following the 
release of the Stern Review firms learn more about the risks and costs associated with climate 
change. Therefore, to the extent that holding more cash as precautionary motive mitigates such 
risk, we expect a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term between our climate 
risk measure (TREND) and the STERN indicator variable (i.e., prior to 2006 and 2006 = 0 or after 
2006 = 1). The results of our difference-in-difference specification, reported in table 6, are 
consistent with this assertion. 
 [Insert Table 6 and Figure 1, about here] 
The significant and positive coefficients of the interaction term, for instance 0.041 (t-statistics: 
5.34) in model (2), tells us that firms do increase cash holding following the release of the Stern 
Review. Additionally, we find similar results by keeping the window fixed (i.e., considering the 
equal time span before and after the event) for a six-year period (in the models (3) and (4)) and for 
a ten-year period (in the models (5) and (6)), respectively.  






Figure 1 depicts the evolution in cash holding behavior of firms highly exposed to climate 
risk (Q4) and all other firms (Q123). We discuss the formation of different quartile groups of 
samples with respect to firms’ exposure to climate risk in section 4.1. This figure uses cash holding 
residuals. These are the residuals of regressing CASH on all the independent variables of our base 
model (i.e., Equation (2)) except TREND. As the residuals are by construction orthogonalized with 
respect to all the independent variables, their behavior around the release of the Stern Report can 
be more easily attributed to the awareness about the risks and costs associated with climate change. 
Here, we observe that firms become more cautious when fall in the severe climate risk group and 
consequently increase their level of cash holdings following the Stern Review. More specifically, 
we observe a sharp increase of cash holdings in group Q4 after 2006 (an increase of average CASH 
residuals from about 0.01 in 2006 to over 0.04 in 2011). In contrast, we observe a declining cash 
holding tendency by the other group (Q123) following Stern Review. 
5.2 The impact of customers’ climate risk exposure 
Our main measurement of climate risk exposure has a legitimate concern related to the use 
of firms headquarter locations. Though it is evident that firms’ major operations and economic 
activities usually run around their headquarter locations (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Chaney et al., 
2012), still it can be argued easily that measuring risk at firms headquarter locations is not 
adequate. We attempt to alleviate this concern using firms’ geographic concentration data in the 
section 4.3.2.1. In this section, we address this issue further and provide more evidence to identify 
the effect of climate risk by exploiting the economic channel between firms and their customers. 
The customers play a vital role in firms’ growth and prosperity. Thus, when firms’ customers are 
faced with climate risk severity, it may also impact firms’ supply chain, productivity, and revenue. 
Considering this fact, we examine the impact of adverse climate change pattern at firms’ customer 






locations on firms’ cash holdings. The customer segment data of Compustat Capital IQ help us 
identify firms’ customer locations. We employ the same methodology of Hong et al. (2019) to 
determine TREND at firms’ customer locations (CSTMR_TREND).  Our analysis, reported in 
table 7, find that customers’ long-term adverse climate change exposure also influences the firms 
to increase their cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 7, about here] 
The 𝛽  coefficient from model (3) of table 1.8 is 0.113 (t-statistics: 1.91). It suggests that for a one 
standard deviation (0.114) increase in climate risk exposure of a firms’ customers leads to about 
1.3% increase in that firms’ cash holdings. our findings from this section is consistent with the 
notion that firms increase their cash holdings even when their customers are exposed to climate 
risk. 
5.3 Placebo tests 
In this section, we attempt to address that the relation we document in this study between 
climate risk and corporate cash holdings is not spurious and not simply the reflection of any time-
varying unobserved factor(s) other than the climate risk. In doing so, we first divide our sample 
into quartiles (for each country, as described in section 4.1) and then conduct placebo tests 
employing nearest neighbor propensity score matching. We match samples in two different ways: 
first, the least exposure quartile, Q1 vs. the highest exposure quartile, Q4; and then lower median 
(Q1 and Q2 together) vs. upper median (Q3 and Q4 together).  In both cases we match samples 
based on the variables: SIZE, MB, LEV, RD, CASH_FLOW, NWC, CAPEX, ACQ, DIV_DUM, 
IND_SIGMA, and industry fixed effects. The key independent variable in this analysis is 
PLACEBO_TREND. We construct this variable by replacing TREND values associated with 






firms in the top quartile, Q4 (or upper median, Q34) with TREND values associated with their 
matched firms in the bottom quartile, Q1 (or lower median Q12). However, the values of 
PLACEBO_TREND remain the same as TREND values for the firms in the bottom quartile, Q1 
(or lower median, Q12). We expect that the coefficient on PLACEBO_TREND from our 
regression model (2) to be small and insignificant. If we find a significant coefficient for 
PLACEBO_TREND, it would indicate that our earlier findings are spurious, and a reflection of 
some unobserved time-varying factor(s). We report the results from the placebo tests in table 8. 
[Insert Table 8, about here] 
The small and insignificant coefficients in the models (1), (2), (3), and (4) of table 8 are consistent 
with our prediction and confirm that our earlier findings are not spurious or the reflection of any 
other unobserved time-varying factor(s). 
6. Subsample analyses 
6.1  Financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms 
So far, it has been evident from our analyses that consistent with our main hypothesis (H1) 
there exists an economically and statistically significant positive relation between firms’ exposure 
to climate risk and corporate cash holdings. We now turn to test our supporting hypotheses. In this 
section, we examine the implications of climate risk under financial constraints.15 Intuitively, an 
increase in firms’ cash holdings due to their long-term adverse climate change exposure should be 
more relevant for financially constrained firms that face a trade-off situation between spending on 
current and future projects. Accordingly, we expect that the increase in cash holdings would be 
 
15 As we discuss earlier, an important question in finance literature is that how firms behave when they become 
financially constrained. A few relevant and renowned studies in this area of literature include Fazzari et al. (1988), 
Whited (1992), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Almeida et al. (2004), Whited and Wu (2006), Hennessy and Whited 
(2007), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), among others. 






more pronounced for the cross-section of the financially constrained firms than for the financially 
unconstrained firms. The researchers rely on different proxies to measure the degree of financial 
constraints. The recent literature uses three popular financial constraints proxies, namely the 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (a.k.a. KZ index), the Whited and Wu (2006) index (a.k.a. WW 
index), and the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index (a.k.a. SA index). We report the results for the 
financially constrained vs. unconstrained cross-sections based on our base model using all three 
common proxies in table 9. 
 [Insert Table 9, about here] 
We find positive and significant 𝛽  coefficients from the models (1), (3), and (5) of table 9 that 
represent the financially constrained firms, whereas the effect is insignificant for financially 
unconstrained firms. Last row of the table shows that the difference between the results of the two 
subsamples is statistically significant for all specifications Overall, the findings from table 9 are 
consistent with our supporting hypothesis, H1-a. 
While we follow Bates et al. (2009), the specification in Almeida et al. (2004) is also widely 
used, particularly for cash holding analyses involving financially constrained firms. Thus, as an 
additional robustness, we redo our financial constraints analyses reported in table 9 employing the 
specification in Almeida et al. (2004) and report the results in table 10. 
[Insert Table 10, about here] 
The results from table 10 are consistent with those of table 9, and together they confirm our earlier 
findings. Specifically, we only find positive and significant coefficients on TREND from the 
models (1), (3), and (5) that represent the financially constrained firms. We also find similar results 






for two other cases. Overall, the results suggest that the financially constrained firms increase cash 
holdings more than the financially unconstrained firms following their exposure to climate risk. 
6.2 Cash shortfall vs. excess cash  
In this section, we examine firms’ behavior in our context based on their cash flow 
positions. The intuition behind this cross-sectional analysis mostly follows from the section 6.1. 
The firms with excess cash holdings are usually in a better position to finance all their current and 
future NPV projects. In contrast, firms with a cash shortfall are significantly more exposed to any 
adverse shock to their cash flows and financing friction would affect them more severely. 
Therefore, we expect that firms with a cash shortfall would increase their cash holdings more when 
exposed to long-term climate risk compared to firms with excess cash very much like financially 
constrained firms. 
Following the recent literature (e.g., Phan et al., 2019 among others), we use the predicted 
values of Bates et al. (2009) cash holding regression as the measure for firms’ optimum level of 
cash holdings. Specifically, we regress CASH on all control variables of our base model excluding 
our key independent variable, TREND, to get the predicted values of cash holdings. We then split 
our observations into two groups by comparing their actual and predicted cash holdings. Firms 
whose actual cash holding is larger (smaller) than the predicted value have excess cash (cash 
shortfall). We report cash shortfall vs. excess cash subsample analysis results in table 11.  
 [Insert Table 11, about here] 
In table 11 we, per our prediction, find positive and significant 𝛽  coefficients for the firms with 
cash shortfall (i.e., models (1) and (2)). In contrast, we get smaller and insignificant 𝛽  coefficients 
for models (3) and (4) representing the firms with an excess cash. The results suggest that the firms 
with a cash shortfall exhibit higher inclination for cash holdings than the firms with an excess cash 






when exposed to climate risk. This finding is consistent with our supporting hypothesis. It further 
strengthens our claims and the enhance the credibility of our earlier findings. 
Following the same intuition from the previous section, we run an additional robustness 
test for our cash shortfall vs. excess cash subsample analysis under Almeida et al. (2004) 
framework. The results are reported in table 12. 
[Insert Table 12, about here] 
Here we also find that the increase in cash holdings is positive and significant for the firms from 
the cash shortfall group (models (1) and (2)). The coefficients on our key independent variable, 
TREND, from the excess cash group (models (3) and (4)) remain small and insignificant. The 
findings from table 12 affirm the case we claim in section 6.3 that the firms with a cash shortfall 
are more likely to increase their cash holdings than the firms with excess cash following a long-
term adverse climate change exposure. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we find that firms hold more cash to mitigate the risk associated with exposure 
to climate change. Our findings are consistent with firms’ precautionary motives framework for 
cash holdings. We present global evidence with data from 41 countries including the US and our 
results are robust to different model specifications and different measures of climate risk. We 
employ three identification strategies. First, we conduct a quasi-natural experiment around a 
release of Stern Review report in 2006 that has important implications in corporate decision 
making (Painter, 2020). Our findings from a difference-in-difference analysis around Stern Review 
indicate that firms increase their cash holdings following the event. Second, we explore an 
economic channel between firms and their customers and find that the firms increase their cash 






holdings when their customers are adversely affected by the climate change. Third, we conduct 
placebo tests by replacing the magnitude of climate risk exposure of highly exposed firms with 
that of less exposed but otherwise comparable firms (we use nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching technique) and find no evidence that our earlier findings are spurious. Our results from 
subsample analyses suggest the increase in cash holdings due to climate risk is significantly 
stronger for financially constrained firms.  
Our study contributes to the modern literature of climate change finance as well as to the classic 
corporate cash holding literature. The implications of climate change for major corporate policies 
is largely unexplored. Our study fills this gap and investigates how the long-term adverse climate 
change exposure would make the firms reshape their cash holdings policy. Overall, our findings 
suggest that firms do view climate change as a risk factor, particularly after the release of the Stern 









16 The debate regarding the existence of climate change is beyond the scope of our study. We simply follow a widely 
used climate change indicator originally developed by climate science and document our findings in the context of 
corporate cash holdings. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Country-wise Breakdown 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE N MEAN SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
CASH 384,966 0.162 0.183 0.010 0.035 0.100 0.219 0.406 
TREND 384,966 0.026 0.128 -0.100 -0.057 -0.016 0.111 0.252 
SIZE 384,966 6.619 3.267 2.555 4.241 6.374 8.884 11.126 
MB 384,966 2.026 3.034 0.763 0.950 1.244 1.880 3.279 
LEV 384,966 0.236 0.222 0 0.042 0.197 0.359 0.524 
RD 384,966 0.028 0.080 0 0 0 0.012 0.077 
CASH_FLOW 384,966 -0.031 0.352 -0.169 -0.005 0.046 0.088 0.132 
NWC 384,966 0.002 0.303 -0.220 -0.079 0.023 0.149 0.275 
CAPEX 384,966 0.065 0.085 0 0.012 0.036 0.083 0.160 
ACQ 384,966 0.009 0.032 0 0 0 0 0.016 
DIV_DUM 384,966 0.420 0.494 0 0 0 1 1 
IND_SIGMA 384,966 0.081 0.070 0.019 0.031 0.055 0.110 0.182 
 
  






Panel B: Country-wise Breakdown 
COUNTRY N  MEAN SD P50  MEAN SD P50 
 TREND  CASH 
Australia 15,245  -0.093 0.056 -0.064  0.228 0.251 0.123 
Austria 1,175  0.241 0.014 0.239  0.121 0.135 0.076 
Belgium 1,545  0.041 0.019 0.034  0.130 0.144 0.081 
Brazil 2,604  0.205 0.032 0.215  0.127 0.128 0.093 
Canada 22,628  -0.099 0.036 -0.084  0.159 0.216 0.065 
Chile 1,402  0.104 0.013 0.103  0.078 0.106 0.047 
China 22,516  0.077 0.054 0.099  0.199 0.154 0.157 
Denmark 1,878  -0.100 0.019 -0.105  0.148 0.178 0.078 
Egypt 739  -0.386 0.048 -0.401  0.150 0.143 0.109 
Finland 1,887  0.014 0.017 0.016  0.131 0.139 0.084 
France 9,841  0.067 0.015 0.065  0.147 0.145 0.103 
Germany 9,891  0.053 0.006 0.054  0.152 0.172 0.088 
Greece 2,587  0.145 0.027 0.140  0.081 0.104 0.044 
India 15,766  -0.150 0.027 -0.156  0.082 0.120 0.035 
Indonesia 3,555  0.004 0.016 0.008  0.115 0.123 0.072 
Ireland 1,281  0.039 0.014 0.042  0.173 0.179 0.106 
Israel 3,332  0.322 0.020 0.318  0.251 0.235 0.174 
Italy 3,040  0.202 0.023 0.211  0.115 0.119 0.078 
Japan 56,323  0.254 0.019 0.256  0.175 0.126 0.143 
Luxembourg 234  0.044 0.022 0.041  0.134 0.110 0.108 
Malaysia 12,166  0.007 0.093 0.043  0.131 0.137 0.087 
Mexico 1,314  -0.178 0.014 -0.181  0.090 0.087 0.065 
Netherlands 2,730  0.046 0.023 0.037  0.113 0.142 0.061 
New_Zealand 1,267  -0.195 0.056 -0.168  0.100 0.160 0.032 
Norway 2,241  -0.153 0.018 -0.159  0.166 0.171 0.107 
Peru 630  0.363 0.017 0.361  0.080 0.108 0.039 
Philippines 1,711  0.176 0.053 0.171  0.129 0.159 0.079 
Poland 3,131  0.128 0.011 0.123  0.102 0.133 0.054 
Portugal 681  -0.013 0.017 -0.013  0.063 0.069 0.039 
Russia 637  -0.093 0.010 -0.090  0.101 0.122 0.061 
Saudi_Arabia 803  0.144 0.101 0.179  0.112 0.126 0.066 
South_Africa 3,670  0.035 0.020 0.034  0.131 0.136 0.092 
South_Korea 10,761  -0.069 0.015 -0.064  0.147 0.125 0.110 
Spain 1,805  -0.008 0.024 -0.006  0.095 0.109 0.062 
Sweden 4,370  -0.028 0.016 -0.025  0.158 0.175 0.095 
Switzerland 3,132  0.136 0.024 0.137  0.169 0.156 0.122 
Taiwan 95  0.379 0.012 0.371  0.259 0.188 0.220 
Thailand 5,701  0.140 0.008 0.140  0.103 0.117 0.058 
Turkey 2,455  -0.075 0.064 -0.057  0.101 0.118 0.058 
UK 23,465  -0.029 0.019 -0.028  0.150 0.183 0.085 
US 124,732  -0.031 0.020 -0.025  0.178 0.215 0.088 
Total 384,966  0.026 0.128 -0.016  0.162 0.183 0.100 
Panel A contains summary statistics of a panel dataset consisting of 384,966 firm-year global observations used in our study from 
41 different countries. There are 37,361 unique firms among which 11,632 are from the United States. We do not consider financial 
and utility firms (two-digit SIC codes: 49 and 60-69). Our key independent variable, TREND, is constructed by following Hong et 
al. (2019) but for the sake of an easier interpretation we flip the sign and multiply it by 1,000 (makes it: the higher the value, the 
higher the climate exposure is). Since the global drought-index (PDSI) used for the construction of TREND is not available beyond 
the year 2014, and prior to 1985 the climate change issue was not largely pronounced in corporate literature, following Hong et al. 
(2019) we restrict our sample period to 1985-2014. All variables except TREND are CPI adjusted. Panel B presents country-wise 
breakdown summary for the key independent variable (TREND) and dependent variable (CASH) of our sample. 
 
 






Table 2: Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: Mean t-test of Cash Holding 
Mean Difference: first quartile (Q1) and fourth quartile (Q4) 
Basis Q1 Q4 Difference t-stats 
TREND (Overall) 0.1491 0.1662 0.0171*** 22.1715 
TREND (Country-wise) 0.1494 0.1733 0.0239*** 28.9348 
Mean Difference: lower median (Q12) and upper median (Q34) 
Basis Q12 Q34 Difference t-stats 
TREND (Overall) 0.1605 0.1643 0.0038*** 6.4543 
TREND (Country-wise) 0.1553 0.1700 0.0147*** 24.9502 
 
  






Panel B: Mean t-test of Cash Holding (Country by Country) 
COUNTRY Q1 Q4 Q4-Q1 t-Stat. Q12 Q34 Q34-Q12 t-Stat. 
Australia 0.1458 0.2757 0.1299*** 23.8626 0.1972 0.2680 0.0708*** 17.4272 
Austria 0.1280 0.1162 -0.0118 -1.0882 0.1254 0.1159 -0.0095 -1.1951 
Belgium 0.1219 0.1409 0.0190* 1.8188 0.1275 0.1320 0.0045 0.6455 
Brazil 0.1188 0.1286 0.0098 1.4263 0.1243 0.1297 0.0054 1.0669 
Canada 0.1044 0.1866 0.0822*** 21.8578 0.1336 0.1852 0.0516*** 18.1215 
Chile 0.0712 0.0780 0.0068 0.9579 0.0777 0.0791 0.0014 0.2458 
China 0.1699 0.2340 0.0641*** 21.5944 0.1773 0.2229 0.0456*** 22.4504 
Denmark 0.1397 0.1714 0.0317*** 2.9427 0.1415 0.1546 0.0131 1.5903 
Egypt 0.1447 0.1611 0.0164 1.1240 0.1496 0.1510 0.0014 0.1288 
Finland 0.1275 0.1250 -0.0025 -0.2937 0.1291 0.1321 0.0030 0.4625 
France 0.1444 0.1563 0.0119*** 2.7504 0.1436 0.1515 0.0079*** 2.6880 
Germany 0.1530 0.1631 0.0101** 2.0561 0.1508 0.1532 0.0024 0.7013 
Greece 0.0785 0.0982 0.0197*** 3.2844 0.0775 0.0850 0.0075* 1.8596 
India 0.0791 0.0798 0.0007 0.2472 0.0793 0.0853 0.0060*** 3.1686 
Indonesia 0.1203 0.1183 -0.0020 -0.3241 0.1134 0.1171 0.0037 0.9056 
Ireland 0.1620 0.1930 0.0310** 2.1671 0.1689 0.1754 0.0065 0.9611 
Israel 0.2492 0.2414 -0.0078 -0.6703 0.2517 0.2493 -0.0024 -0.2912 
Italy 0.1068 0.1236 0.0168*** 2.8169 0.1118 0.1186 0.0068 1.5510 
Japan 0.1958 0.1778 -0.0180 -11.5816 0.1787 0.1710 -0.0077*** -7.1904 
Luxembourg 0.1568 0.1029 -0.0539** -2.5375 0.1579 0.1086 -0.0493*** -3.5191 
Malaysia 0.1559 0.1070 -0.0489*** -14.3462 0.1461 0.1125 -0.0336*** -13.5422 
Mexico 0.0752 0.0999 0.0247*** 3.7135 0.0844 0.0968 0.0124** 2.5841 
Netherlands 0.1181 0.0917 -0.0264*** -3.6569 0.1202 0.1059 -0.0143*** -2.6437 
New_Zealand 0.0810 0.1045 0.0235* 1.7936 0.0903 0.1108 0.0205** 2.2600 
Norway 0.1591 0.1665 0.0074 0.7361 0.1632 0.1690 0.0058 0.7962 
Peru 0.0626 0.0823 0.0197** 2.1333 0.0757 0.0856 0.0099 1.1442 
Philippines 0.1549 0.1072 -0.0477*** -4.3030 0.1464 0.1111 -0.0353*** -4.6021 
Poland 0.1044 0.1081 0.0037 0.5463 0.1024 0.1024 0.0000 -0.0027 
Portugal 0.0550 0.0653 0.0103 1.3715 0.0569 0.0688 0.0119** 2.2447 
Russia 0.0995 0.1002 0.0007 0.3791 0.0988 0.1049 0.0061 0.6139 
Saudi_Arabia 0.1345 0.1071 -0.0274* -1.8920 0.1180 0.1050 -0.0130 -1.4118 
South_Africa 0.1212 0.1222 0.0010 0.1637 0.1288 0.1306 0.0018 0.9376 
South_Korea 0.1344 0.1590 0.0246*** 6.6240 0.1411 0.1540 0.0129*** 5.3310 
Spain 0.0926 0.0987 0.0061 0.8312 0.0908 0.0998 0.0090* 1.7538 
Sweden 0.1506 0.1627 0.0121 1.6114 0.1516 0.1656 0.0140** 2.6149 
Switzerland 0.1582 0.1824 0.0242*** 2.9376 0.1583 0.1800 0.0217*** 3.8889 
Taiwan  -  - -  - 0.2553 0.2637 0.0084 0.2128 
Thailand 0.1138 0.0893 -0.0245*** -5.5639 0.1094 0.0937 -0.0157*** -5.0445 
Turkey 0.0949 0.1101 0.0152** 2.3109 0.0989 0.1043 0.0054 1.1275 
UK 0.1444 0.1373 -0.0071** -2.2470 0.1534 0.1446 -0.0088*** -2.9328 
US 0.1565 0.1972 0.0407*** 23.9911 0.1664 0.1904 0.0240*** 19.7197 
In this table panel A presents mean t-tests of our dependent variable (CASH) in terms of key independent variable (TREND) 
grouped into the first and fourth quartiles and upper and lower medians. We look for both overall (groups are made using all data) 
scenario and country-wise (groups are made for each country separately) scenario. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Panel B presents country-wise breakdown of mean t-tests. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 












Table 3: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH FCASH FCASH ∆CASH ∆CASH 
       
TREND 0.076*** 0.031** 0.059*** 0.024* 2.079** 5.785*** 
 (6.07) (2.37) (4.51) (1.76) (2.06) (3.15) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.022 0.044* 
 (-13.44) (-13.52) (-13.39) (-13.52) (0.91) (1.85) 
MB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.258*** -0.223*** 
 (15.46) (13.77) (10.48) (9.21) (-4.80) (-4.87) 
LEV -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.283*** -0.283*** 0.575** 0.595** 
 (-92.81) (-91.80) (-81.09) (-80.27) (2.41) (2.56) 
RD 0.461*** 0.471*** 0.483*** 0.492*** 2.782*** 1.934*** 
 (37.38) (37.62) (35.08) (35.14) (2.79) (2.75) 
CASH_FLOW -0.010*** -0.006** -0.009*** -0.004 0.445 0.208 
 (-3.96) (-2.21) (-2.77) (-1.31) (1.54) (0.82) 
NWC -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.095*** 0.007 -0.066 
 (-30.34) (-30.98) (-28.47) (-28.90) (0.05) (-0.46) 
CAPEX -0.202*** -0.197*** -0.216*** -0.212*** -0.913 -0.906 
 (-35.43) (-33.89) (-35.73) (-34.51) (-1.34) (-1.24) 
ACQ -0.286*** -0.291*** -0.273*** -0.277*** -0.404** -0.336 
 (-33.81) (-33.95) (-30.33) (-30.49) (-2.10) (-1.61) 
DIV_DUM -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.079 -0.052 
 (-11.36) (-11.30) (-9.40) (-9.43) (-0.93) (-0.58) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.303*** 0.297*** -2.325** -0.841 
 (20.73) (20.05) (18.91) (18.02) (-2.22) (-1.23) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  0.000***  0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (5.87)  (6.04)  (-6.73) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  0.000***  0.000*  0.001 
  (2.58)  (1.66)  (0.27) 
CPI  -0.023***  -0.039***  3.732*** 
  (-4.27)  (-6.56)  (2.78) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  0.000***  0.000***  -0.002*** 
  (11.05)  (9.23)  (-2.83) 
CONSTANT 0.238*** 0.172*** 0.234*** 0.183*** 0.141 7.278*** 
 (77.91) (15.47) (71.63) (15.83) (0.68) (7.65) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 384,966 373,344 327,261 319,363 327,261 317,164 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.337 0.340 0.315 0.318 0.010 0.014 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents our baseline results. The dependent variable for models (1) and (2) is CASH (sum of cash and marketable 
securities scaled by total asset). In models (3) and (4) we use FCASH (lead CASH) and in models (5) and (6) we use ∆CASH 
(change in CASH) as dependent variable. Our key independent variable (TREND) is constructed by following Hong et al. (2019) 
but we flip the sign and multiply it by 1,000 for the sake of an easier interpretation of the results. The higher value of TREND 
indicates higher climate change exposure. We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control variables in models (1), (3) and (5). Models 
(2), (4) and (6) include several country-level macroeconomic factors as additional controls to models (1), (3) and (5). All variables 
are defined in Appendix-Table-1.1 (A 1.1). Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and 
country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 








Table 4: Baseline Results excluding U.S. firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH FCASH FCASH ∆CASH ∆CASH 
       
TREND 0.082*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 2.210* 6.554*** 
 (6.03) (4.09) (4.00) (3.82) (1.85) (3.26) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.064* 0.089** 
 (-14.55) (-13.77) (-13.48) (-13.02) (1.78) (2.45) 
MB 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.367*** -0.308*** 
 (15.01) (13.27) (12.27) (11.06) (-4.22) (-4.40) 
LEV -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.265*** -0.264*** 0.195 0.206 
 (-74.18) (-73.38) (-65.38) (-64.67) (0.86) (1.16) 
RD 0.420*** 0.434*** 0.437*** 0.445*** 3.161* 1.274* 
 (20.87) (20.77) (19.72) (19.39) (1.77) (1.71) 
CASH_FLOW -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 0.495 -0.160 
 (-14.72) (-13.40) (-14.05) (-12.88) (0.82) (-0.51) 
NWC -0.082*** -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.082*** 0.003 -0.216* 
 (-23.27) (-24.54) (-20.71) (-21.46) (0.01) (-1.74) 
CAPEX -0.163*** -0.159*** -0.176*** -0.174*** -1.100 -0.832 
 (-22.93) (-21.79) (-23.83) (-23.12) (-1.24) (-0.85) 
ACQ -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.224*** -0.220*** 0.517 0.476 
 (-20.26) (-19.94) (-17.14) (-16.61) (1.17) (1.14) 
DIV_DUM -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.186 -0.084 
 (-0.66) (-0.23) (-0.16) (-0.07) (-1.40) (-0.67) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.194*** 0.190*** -2.795* -0.618 
 (12.34) (12.28) (11.35) (11.19) (-1.75) (-0.81) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  0.000**  0.000  -0.000*** 
  (2.28)  (1.52)  (-6.68) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  0.000  -0.000  0.002 
  (0.42)  (-1.45)  (0.49) 
CPI  -0.023***  -0.040***  3.988*** 
  (-4.34)  (-6.81)  (2.98) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  0.000***  0.000***  -0.006*** 
  (6.98)  (4.04)  (-5.75) 
CONSTANT 0.242*** 0.230*** 0.235*** 0.256*** -0.024 5.344*** 
 (66.34) (20.96) (60.54) (22.33) (-0.08) (7.46) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 260,233 248,611 221,727 213,829 221,727 211,630 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.308 0.310 0.286 0.288 0.012 0.018 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents our baseline results excluding U.S. firms. The dependent variable for models (1) and (2) is CASH (sum of cash 
and marketable securities scaled by total asset). In models (3) and (4) we use FCASH (lead CASH) and in models (5) and (6) we 
use ∆CASH (change in CASH) as dependent variable. Our key independent variable (TREND) is constructed by following Hong 
et al. (2019) but we flip the sign and multiply it by 1,000 for the sake of an easier interpretation of the results. The higher value of 
TREND indicates higher climate change exposure. We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control variables in models (1), (3) and (5). 
Models (2), (4) and (6) include several country-level macroeconomic factors as additional controls to models (1), (3) and (5). All 
variables are defined in Appendix-Table-1.1 (A 1.1). Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed 
effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 






Table 5: Alternative proxies for climate change risk – limited sample 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH 
   
WT_STTREND 0.121***  
 (2.75)  
LOG_ENRISK  0.002*** 
  (2.98) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.010*** 
 (-2.59) (-8.48) 
MB 0.005*** 0.010*** 
 (7.43) (7.08) 
LEV -0.340*** -0.260*** 
 (-42.48) (-25.32) 
RD 0.464*** 0.714*** 
 (21.67) (21.32) 
CASH_FLOW 0.018*** 0.061*** 
 (2.96) (4.66) 
NWC -0.111*** -0.199*** 
 (-15.77) (-15.16) 
CAPEX -0.306*** -0.419*** 
 (-18.20) (-16.00) 
ACQ -0.352*** -0.433*** 
 (-22.24) (-23.98) 
DIV_DUM -0.045*** -0.030*** 
 (-12.43) (-8.98) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.275*** 0.229*** 
 (5.38) (6.30) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  0.000 
  (0.36) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  -0.000*** 
  (-3.76) 
CPI  -0.026 
  (-0.66) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  0.000 
  (0.72) 
CONSTANT 0.253*** 0.322*** 
 (27.73) (3.81) 
   
OBSERVATIONS 53,414 34,093 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.448 0.528 
YEAR FE Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes 
This table presents results for alternative climate risk proxies (firm-level). Model (1) considers Weighted State TREND 
(WT_STTREND) as the key independent variable. Here, we consider two important facts: 1. a significant number of our 
observations are from the U.S., and 2. state-level PDSI data for 48 U.S. mainland-states are also available. Applying the same 
methodology from Hong et al. (2019) we first construct state-level-TREND. We further alleviate the potential concern that Head 
Quarter (HQ) state of a firm and its’ operational location can be different. We multiply firms’ geographic concentration in different 
states (Garcia and Norli, 2012) with its state-level-TREND from those states to create an overall weighted-state-TREND that 
becomes a firm-specific measure. In model (2), we consider another firm-level proxy as the key independent variable developed 
by Hassan et al. (2019). This proxy (hereby log_enrisk = log (1+ env. risk)), largely measures firms’ political risk due to 
climate/environmental legislation. The dependent variable for models (1) and (2) is CASH (sum of cash and marketable securities 
scaled by total asset). We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control variables in model (1). Model (2) includes several country-level 
macroeconomic factors as additional controls to model (1). However, the sample period is limited (1992-2008 for model (1) and 
2002-2014 for model (2)) due to unavailability of data. All variables are defined in Appendix-Table-1 (A1). Both models consider 
year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We 
report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 







Table 6: Impact of Stern Review (2006) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 No Fixed Window  6 Years (2004-2009)  10 Years (2002-2011) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH  CASH CASH  CASH CASH 
         
TREND*STERN 0.019*** 0.041***  0.046*** 0.034***  0.049*** 0.043*** 
 (2.97) (5.34)  (6.98) (4.18)  (7.35) (5.45) 
TREND 0.073*** 0.017  -0.003 -0.025  0.040** 0.029 
 (5.75) (1.24)  (-0.10) (-0.90)  (2.04) (1.48) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-13.35) (-13.42)  (-15.64) (-15.52)  (-15.31) (-14.99) 
MB 0.004*** 0.004***  0.004*** 0.004***  0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (15.50) (13.87)  (8.80) (8.45)  (10.47) (9.72) 
LEV -0.311*** -0.311***  -0.317*** -0.317***  -0.316*** -0.316*** 
 (-92.80) (-91.81)  (-61.62) (-61.29)  (-70.55) (-70.08) 
RD 0.460*** 0.471***  0.522*** 0.526***  0.504*** 0.512*** 
 (37.37) (37.62)  (27.93) (27.97)  (31.20) (31.34) 
CASH_FLOW -0.010*** -0.006**  -0.009** -0.008*  -0.009** -0.007** 
 (-3.97) (-2.18)  (-2.03) (-1.74)  (-2.49) (-2.01) 
NWC -0.087*** -0.090***  -0.072*** -0.073***  -0.071*** -0.073*** 
 (-30.35) (-30.97)  (-15.23) (-15.43)  (-17.99) (-18.39) 
CAPEX -0.204*** -0.197***  -0.218*** -0.216***  -0.219*** -0.213*** 
 (-35.50) (-33.82)  (-20.87) (-20.55)  (-24.25) (-23.35) 
ACQ -0.286*** -0.291***  -0.362*** -0.364***  -0.359*** -0.359*** 
 (-33.83) (-34.01)  (-24.90) (-24.89)  (-28.53) (-28.29) 
DIV_DUM -0.013*** -0.013***  -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-11.42) (-11.33)  (-5.24) (-4.98)  (-6.16) (-5.97) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.319*** 0.317***  0.302*** 0.304***  0.306*** 0.306*** 
 (20.91) (20.12)  (14.04) (14.08)  (16.35) (16.17) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  0.000***   0.000   0.000*** 
  (6.91)   (1.21)   (2.65) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  0.000***   -0.000   -0.000 
  (3.57)   (-1.38)   (-0.21) 
CPI  -0.008   -0.042**   -0.025** 
  (-1.31)   (-2.09)   (-2.45) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  0.000***   0.000***   0.000** 
  (10.61)   (3.52)   (2.52) 
CONSTANT 0.238*** 0.145***  0.269*** 0.276***  0.259*** 0.228*** 
 (77.71) (12.31)  (55.02) (10.42)  (61.67) (11.07) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 384,966 373,344  106,065 104,995  177,292 174,064 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.337 0.340  0.364 0.365  0.352 0.353 
YEAR FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
This table presents results of CASH around the Stern Review (an extensive report detailing pros and cons of climate change on 
economic and business policies published in 2006). We look for the impacts under three different sample settings (i.e., no fixed 
window, 6 years window, and 10 years window). We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control variables in models (1), (3), and (5). 
Models (2), (4), and (6) include several country-level macroeconomic factors as additional controls to models (1), (3), and (5). All 
variables are defined in Appendix-Table-1 (A1). Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, 
and country fixed effects. The dummy Stern (if observation year is later than 2006) drops out from the models due to year fixed 
effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 












Table 7: Customer segmentation analysis - limited sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH CASH 
    
CSTMR_TREND 0.109* 0.121** 0.113* 
 (1.76) (1.96) (1.91) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (-3.15) (-2.99) (-2.43) 
MB 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (2.42) (2.10) (2.27) 
LEV -0.324*** -0.327*** -0.334*** 
 (-18.50) (-18.41) (-19.00) 
RD 0.448*** 0.462*** 0.460*** 
 (9.33) (9.86) (9.78) 
CASH_FLOW 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 
 (3.52) (3.63) (3.49) 
NWC -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.108*** 
 (-7.40) (-7.41) (-7.64) 
CAPEX -0.300*** -0.311*** -0.332*** 
 (-5.91) (-6.38) (-6.87) 
ACQ -0.364*** -0.367*** -0.353*** 
 (-10.65) (-10.44) (-10.65) 
DIV_DUM -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (-6.34) (-6.17) (-6.34) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.121** 0.215*** 0.211*** 
 (2.23) (3.61) (3.53) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.92) (-0.20) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.12) (-0.84) 
CPI  -0.081 -0.054 
  (-1.38) (-0.97) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.22) (-0.27) 
CONSTANT 0.273*** 0.387*** 0.369** 
 (18.53) (6.85) (2.44) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 25,755 24,948 24,948 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.416 0.418 0.426 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes 
COUNTRY (of CSTMR) FE Yes Yes Yes 
COUNTRY (of FIRMS) FE No No Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results for TREND at customers’ geographic end (CSTMR_TREND) rather than firms’ end as key independent 
variable since businesses are run on customers’ need and ultimate products/services need to be supplied at customers’ geographic 
locations. The dependent variable for models (1), (2), and (3) is CASH (sum of cash and marketable securities scaled by total asset). 
We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control variables in model (1). Models (2), and (3) include several country-level macroeconomic 
factors (from firms’ country) as additional controls to model (1). However, the sample is limited (based on the availability at 
COMPUSTAT Capital IQ Customer Segmentation database). All variables are defined in Appendix-Table-1 (A1). While models 
(1), and (2) consider year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and country (of customers) fixed effects, model (3) 
additionally considers country (of firms) fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 








Table 8: Placebo test using propensity score match 
 Q1 and Q4  Q12 and Q34 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CASH CASH  CASH CASH 
      
PLACEBO_TREND 0.001 -0.001  0.002 -0.001 
 (0.30) (-0.39)  (0.94) (-0.35) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.005***  -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-12.30) (-12.61)  (-13.16) (-13.46) 
MB 0.004*** 0.003***  0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (12.06) (10.57)  (15.50) (13.76) 
LEV -0.310*** -0.309***  -0.311*** -0.311*** 
 (-84.04) (-83.26)  (-92.89) (-91.84) 
RD 0.479*** 0.488***  0.460*** 0.471*** 
 (34.81) (35.00)  (37.35) (37.61) 
CASH_FLOW -0.012*** -0.008**  -0.011*** -0.006** 
 (-3.88) (-2.53)  (-4.04) (-2.23) 
NWC -0.092*** -0.094***  -0.087*** -0.090*** 
 (-27.73) (-28.19)  (-30.38) (-30.98) 
CAPEX -0.182*** -0.184***  -0.203*** -0.197*** 
 (-28.68) (-28.43)  (-35.44) (-33.85) 
ACQ -0.280*** -0.290***  -0.286*** -0.291*** 
 (-27.20) (-27.87)  (-33.90) (-34.02) 
DIV_DUM -0.013*** -0.013***  -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-10.45) (-10.31)  (-11.52) (-11.38) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA 0.311*** 0.325***  0.322*** 0.317*** 
 (17.97) (17.89)  (21.28) (20.18) 
GDP_PERCAPITA  0.000***   0.000*** 
  (3.74)   (6.33) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP  0.000   0.000*** 
  (0.23)   (3.01) 
CPI  -0.026***   -0.025*** 
  (-4.38)   (-4.58) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP  0.000***   0.000*** 
  (11.87)   (11.43) 
CONSTANT 0.240*** 0.195***  0.239*** 0.168*** 
 (71.78) (15.82)  (78.22) (15.17) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 191,832 188,366  384,966 373,344 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.347 0.350  0.337 0.340 
YEAR FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
This table presents placebo test results using propensity score match technique. The dependent variable is CASH (sum of cash and 
marketable securities scaled by total asset). The key independent variable (TREND) comes from the opposite group of propensity 
score matched sample. While matching, we also care for industry along with the usual controls in Bates et al. (2009).  Regarding 
sample size: models (1), and (2) cover first and fourth quartiles (Q1 and Q4), while models (3), and (4) cover lower-median (Q12) 
and upper-median (Q34) of country-wise TREND from matched opposite group. We follow Bates et al. (2009) to set control 
variables in models (1) and (3). Models (2) and (4) include several country-level macroeconomic factors as additional controls to 
models (1) and (3). All variables are defined in Appendix-Table-1 (A1). Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-
digit SIC) fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 









Table 9: Subsample: financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms (Base Model) 
 KZ Index  WW Index  SA Index 
 Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained 
VARIABLES ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH 
         
TREND 18.603*** 0.249  36.577*** -0.003  1.422* -0.071 
 (3.07) (0.71)  (3.29) (-0.20)  (1.93) (-0.20) 
SIZE 0.023 0.039**  -0.909*** -0.000*  -0.012 0.179*** 
 (0.33) (2.06)  (-5.55) (-1.72)  (-0.35) (2.81) 
MB -0.237*** -0.166  -0.370*** -0.002  -0.095*** -0.091 
 (-4.80) (-0.94)  (-3.20) (-0.83)  (-3.04) (-1.36) 
LEV 1.477** 0.099  1.374*** -0.015***  1.610*** -0.201 
 (2.31) (0.54)  (4.03) (-6.53)  (2.58) (-1.59) 
RD 2.989** 1.560  0.893 -0.018  2.151** -1.047 
 (2.13) (0.97)  (1.64) (-1.02)  (2.30) (-1.48) 
CASH_FLOW -0.022 1.277  0.401 0.132***  0.883*** -0.020 
 (-0.06) (1.46)  (1.42) (8.48)  (4.76) (-0.08) 
NWC 0.223 -0.110  0.048 -0.036***  0.531* 0.147 
 (0.73) (-1.12)  (0.25) (-15.82)  (1.95) (1.20) 
CAPEX -2.069 -1.315  -1.647 -0.116***  -2.099 -1.240 
 (-1.15) (-1.03)  (-1.00) (-10.12)  (-1.41) (-1.48) 
ACQ 1.066** -0.758***  3.485*** -0.180***  -0.544* 0.299 
 (2.10) (-6.06)  (3.07) (-15.30)  (-1.92) (1.42) 
DIV_DUM -0.349 -0.072  -2.673*** 0.006***  -0.290* -0.299*** 
 (-1.35) (-1.03)  (-5.13) (4.42)  (-1.70) (-2.66) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA -1.820 0.261  -5.957*** 0.003  -0.678 0.754** 
 (-0.85) (0.68)  (-3.17) (0.29)  (-0.67) (2.28) 
GDP_PERCAPITA -0.001*** -0.000  -0.002*** -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-5.50) (-0.93)  (-6.36) (-6.10)  (-3.02) (-4.21) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP -0.018* 0.002  -0.077*** 0.000**  0.002 0.006** 
 (-1.70) (1.08)  (-2.78) (2.25)  (0.99) (2.18) 
CPI 10.665*** -0.084**  68.716*** -0.037***  0.093 0.744 
 (2.99) (-2.18)  (3.44) (-5.91)  (0.14) (1.07) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP -0.002 -0.001  -0.025*** 0.000***  -0.004** -0.000 
 (-1.14) (-0.83)  (-2.93) (3.99)  (-2.10) (-0.44) 
CONSTANT 11.234*** 1.011  51.509*** 0.076***  12.542*** 2.645*** 
 (6.33) (1.08)  (6.09) (10.68)  (3.07) (3.55) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 95,846 94,886  86,754 94,407  84,005 108,090 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.019 0.006  0.112 0.028  0.011 0.014 
YEAR FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
DIFF. IN COEFFICIENTS: 
 ꭓ2 (P-VALUE) 
9.17 (0.0025)  11.48 (0.0007)  3.33 (0.0681) 
This table presents subsample analysis results for financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms differentiated through three 
popular measures: Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index (1997), Whited and Wu (WW) Index (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (SA) Index 
(2010). The dependent variable is ∆CASH (change in cash scaled by total asset). For the model set-up we largely follow Bates et 
al. (2009). Since our study is global, we additionally control for a set of country-specific macroeconomic factors. Every model 
considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by 
firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Table 10: Subsample: financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms (Almeida et al., 2004 
Model) 
 KZ Index  WW Index  SA Index 
 Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained  Constrained Unconstrained 
VARIABLES ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH 
         
TREND 12.626** 0.308  23.797*** 0.004  1.601** 0.297 
 (2.57) (0.84)  (2.63) (0.40)  (2.09) (1.21) 
CASH_FLOW_SEN 0.018 0.454***  0.181** 0.030  0.028 0.067 
 (0.84) (6.61)  (2.01) (1.32)  (0.98) (1.28) 
TOBINQ -0.026*** -0.105  -0.049 -0.000  -0.020 -0.002 
 (-3.02) (-0.89)  (-1.30) (-0.57)  (-1.61) (-0.45) 
SIZE -0.074 0.003  -0.583*** -0.000  -0.086 0.069* 
 (-1.43) (0.26)  (-4.41) (-0.64)  (-1.23) (1.73) 
CAPEX -0.134 0.192  -0.661 -0.109***  -0.370 -1.038 
 (-0.10) (0.53)  (-0.48) (-9.16)  (-0.39) (-1.22) 
ACQ 0.781* -0.841***  2.680*** -0.216***  0.107 -0.378*** 
 (1.80) (-3.87)  (2.87) (-13.15)  (0.29) (-2.64) 
DELTA_NWC 0.355** 0.729  0.132 -108.001***  0.376** 170.301*** 
 (2.32) (0.90)  (0.78) (-3.47)  (2.42) (3.15) 
DELTA_ST_DEBT 0.121*** 1.296  0.117*** 0.118***  0.070** 0.516*** 
 (3.92) (1.34)  (3.49) (2.93)  (2.41) (4.92) 
GDP_PERCAPITA -0.000*** -0.000*  -0.002*** -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (-3.21) (-1.81)  (-4.83) (-6.29)  (-2.80) (-2.13) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP -0.016* 0.003**  -0.047** 0.000*  -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.76) (2.08)  (-2.06) (1.90)  (-0.05) (-0.48) 
CPI 7.489** 0.016  46.185*** -0.040***  0.182 0.552 
 (2.54) (0.25)  (2.72) (-7.18)  (0.27) (1.17) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP -0.003** 0.000  -0.015** 0.000***  -0.005*** -0.000 
 (-2.37) (0.03)  (-2.46) (4.48)  (-2.84) (-0.89) 
CONSTANT 5.888*** 1.178*  36.174*** 0.085***  12.383*** 0.118 
 (3.42) (1.74)  (4.44) (10.22)  (2.98) (0.22) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 95,848 94,886  88,759 93,192  84,005 108,090 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.241 0.430  0.222 0.112  0.179 0.387 
YEAR FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
DIFF. IN COEFFICIENTS: 
 ꭓ2 (P-VALUE) 
6.27 (0.0123)  6.95 (0.0084)  2.62 (0.1055) 
This table presents subsample analysis results for financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms differentiated through three 
popular measures: Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index (1997), Whited and Wu (WW) Index (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (SA) Index 
(2010). The dependent variable is ∆CASH (change in cash scaled by total asset). For the model set-up we largely follow Almeida 
et al. (2004). Since our study is global, we additionally control for a set of country-specific macroeconomic factors. Every model 
considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by 












Table 11: Subsample: cash shortfall vs. excess cash (Base Model) 
  Cash Shortfall  Excess Cash 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH 
       
TREND  2.536** 7.068***  1.234 3.847 
  (2.51) (3.27)  (0.55) (1.15) 
SIZE  -0.022 0.001  0.113** 0.132** 
  (-1.19) (0.05)  (2.00) (2.28) 
MB  -0.267*** -0.218***  -0.247** -0.237** 
  (-4.10) (-4.75)  (-2.38) (-2.16) 
LEV  0.241 0.370  0.855** 0.759** 
  (0.71) (1.22)  (2.30) (2.00) 
RD  2.944* 1.639*  2.430** 2.213* 
  (1.85) (1.88)  (2.14) (1.80) 
CASH_FLOW  0.368 0.033  0.566 0.460 
  (0.89) (0.12)  (1.25) (0.90) 
NWC  -0.261* -0.262*  0.580 0.474 
  (-1.69) (-1.67)  (1.61) (1.30) 
CAPEX  -0.640 -0.859  -1.332 -1.061 
  (-0.68) (-0.85)  (-1.41) (-1.05) 
ACQ  -0.120 -0.095  -0.600 -0.423 
  (-0.71) (-0.50)  (-1.43) (-0.96) 
DIV_DUM  0.075 0.101  -0.277 -0.256 
  (1.14) (1.55)  (-1.53) (-1.30) 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA  -2.929** -1.062*  -0.413 0.246 
  (-2.14) (-1.90)  (-0.22) (0.13) 
GDP_PERCAPITA   -0.000***   -0.000*** 
   (-5.43)   (-4.37) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP   -0.005   0.010 
   (-1.21)   (1.26) 
CPI   4.080***   3.040 
   (2.77)   (1.16) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP   -0.004***   -0.000 
   (-3.97)   (-0.08) 
CONSTANT  0.573** 7.203***  -0.718* 8.037*** 
  (2.21) (6.41)  (-1.83) (5.08) 
       
OBSERVATIONS  194,047 186,910  133,214 130,254 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED  0.008 0.018  0.015 0.016 
YEAR FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 




This table presents subsample analysis results for Cash Shortfall vs. Excess Cash. We determine the two sub-groups (Cash Shortfall 
and Excess Cash) based on the predicted value (of CASH) following Bates et al. (2009). If the actual level of CASH of an observation 
is smaller (larger) than the predicted value, it falls into the Cash Shortfall (Excess Cash) sub-group. The dependent variable is 
∆CASH (change in cash scaled by total asset). Since our study is global, in addition to models (1), and (3), we control for a set of 
country-specific macroeconomic factors in models (2), and (4). Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) 
fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by firms. We report t-statistics in the parenthesis. ***, **, 










Table 12: Subsample: cash shortfall vs. excess cash (Almeida et al., 2004 Model) 
   Cash Shortfall  Excess Cash 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES   ∆CASH ∆CASH  ∆CASH ∆CASH 
        
TREND   1.353** 4.193***  1.740 3.480 
   (2.00) (2.60)  (0.96) (1.49) 
CASH_FLOW_SEN   0.024 0.027  0.027 0.081 
   (0.89) (0.94)  (0.34) (0.50) 
TOBINQ   -0.028*** -0.023***  -0.029* -0.026 
   (-2.83) (-2.69)  (-1.72) (-1.30) 
SIZE   -0.025 -0.029*  0.080 0.048 
   (-1.26) (-1.74)  (1.53) (0.96) 
CAPEX   0.048 -0.235  -0.054 1.002 
   (0.08) (-0.40)  (-0.05) (0.92) 
ACQ   -0.151 -0.166  -0.121 -0.066 
   (-1.29) (-1.32)  (-0.28) (-0.14) 
DELTA_NWC   0.484** 0.410**  0.184 0.252 
   (2.40) (1.97)  (0.95) (1.26) 
DELTA_ST_DEBT   0.096*** 0.099***  0.221** 0.374*** 
   (4.05) (4.09)  (2.32) (3.34) 
GDP_PERCAPITA    -0.000***   -0.000*** 
    (-3.49)   (-4.25) 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP    -0.003   0.006 
    (-1.00)   (0.85) 
CPI    2.333**   2.652 
    (2.12)   (1.42) 
STOCKMARKET_CAP    -0.003***   -0.001* 
    (-3.47)   (-1.71) 
CONSTANT   0.145 4.217***  -0.773** 4.731*** 
   (0.98) (4.10)  (-2.06) (4.08) 
        
OBSERVATIONS   194,047 186,910  133,214 130,254 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED   0.149 0.330  0.144 0.213 
YEAR FE   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
COUNTRY FE   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
FIRM CLUSTERING   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
DIFF IN COEFFS (MODELS (2) AND 
(4)): ꭓ2 (P-VALUE) 
  
0.01 (0.9266) 
This table presents subsample analysis results for Cash Shortfall vs. Excess Cash. We determine the two sub-groups (Cash Shortfall 
and Excess Cash) based on the predicted value (of CASH) following Bates et al. (2009). If the actual level of CASH of an observation 
is smaller (larger) than the predicted value, it falls into the Cash Shortfall (Excess Cash) sub-group. The dependent variable is 
∆CASH (change in cash scaled by total asset). For the model set-up we largely follow Almeida et al. (2004). Since our study is 
global, in addition to models (1), and (3), we control for a set of country-specific macroeconomic factors in models (2), and (4). 
Every model considers year fixed effects, industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The standard errors are 













Table A1: Variable description 
 
Dependent Variables 
CASH Cash scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat 
FCASH Lead (forward) value of CASH. Source: Compustat 
∆CASH Change in cash scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat 
  
Key Independent Variable 
TREND Yearly average of time-coefficient (times -1,000) from an augmented AR(1) model using country-
level monthly frequency historical Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) data extending back to 
1900 from a point of time following Hong et al. (2019). Source: NOAA’s NCDC 
  
Control Variables 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the deflated total assets [log(at/cpi)]. We use the exchange rate data available 
in the Compustat Global database to convert a firm’s total asset to U.S. dollars. 
MB (TOBINQ) Market to book ratio is the ratio of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of 
equity scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat 
LEV Total debt over total assets. Source: Compustat 
RD Ratio of Research and Development expenditure over the sales. We replace missing values of R&D 
expenditure by zeros. Source: Compustat 
CASH_FLOW Earnings before interest and taxes, but before depreciation and amortization, less interest, taxes, 
and common dividends, over total assets. Source: Compustat 
NWC Net working capital minus cash over total assets. Source: Compustat 
CAPEX Capital expenditures over total assets. Source: Compustat 
ACQ Acquisitions over total assets. Source: Compustat 
DIV_DUM An indicator variable that is equal to one if common dividends are non-zero. We replace the missing 
values of dividends by zero. Source: Compustat 
CASH_FLOW_SEN Sum of cash income before extraordinary items (ibc), plus depreciation and amortization (dp), 
minus common dividends (dvc) over total assets (at). Source: Compustat 
INDUSTRY_SIGMA Mean of the standard deviation of the cash flows over the past 10 years by year and two-digit 
industry (SIC) code. Source: Compustat 
GDP_PERCAPITA Gross Development Product per capita. Source: World Bank 
PRIVATECREDIT_GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Source: World Bank 
CPI Consumer Price Index. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 




















Figure 1: Corporate cash holding following the Stern Review (2006)  
 
 
This figure presents the difference in corporate cash holding following the Stern Review (2006). The 
group-1 (red line) takes the value of 1 if the observation belongs to the subsample with highest climate 
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